Itisdifficulttoconsiderdebtashavingahistory,becauseitseemslike debtmightbethatimpossiblethinginhistory,somethingthathasexisted forever.In1917,onepopularhistoriandescribeddebtasa"semislavery ... [which] existedbeforethedawnofhistory,anditexiststoday."
1 Peo ple,inacertainsense,havealwayslentmoneytooneanother:overthe dinnertabletoawaywardbrother;acrossasaloonbartoagoodcus tomer;overalunchpailtoahardpressedcoworker.Butevenby1917, asthatpopularhistorywaswritten,theancient,personalrelationshipof debtwaschangingintosomethingthathadneverhappenedbefore.
Whilepersonallendinghadalwaysexisted,before1917ithadnever beenlegaltochargeinterestrateshighenoughtoturnaprofitand,equally important,lendershadneverbeenabletoreselltheircustomers'debtsor borrowagainstthem.Inshort,personaldebthadneverbeenabletobea normal business. Personal debt remained disconnected from the great flowsofcapital-confinedtothemarginsoftheeconomy.Thebigmoney inAmericawasmadebyturningthehardworkofAmericansintocom modities, not by lending those workers money.The wealthy could get personalloansatbanks,alongsidetheirbusinessaffairs,butforevery bodyelsecreditremainedoutsidetheconventionaleconomy.Whywould theCarnegiesandMorgansoftheworldwanttotieuptheircapitalin loanstosteelworkers,whentheycouldmakesomuchmoremoneyby building steel plants? When friends and family were tapped out, loan sharks-whoseinterestratesdwarfedeventhemostsubprimeoflender's ratestoday-couldprovidecash,butthesesmalltimerscouldnevercom pareinpowerorwealthtotheGildedAgetitansofsteelandrail.Bythe endofthetwentiethcentury,however,suchpettyloanstoworkershad becomeoneofAmericancapitalism'smostsignificantproducts,extracted andtradedasifdebtwerejustanothercommodity,asrealassteel.Con sumerfinancehadmovedfromtheshadowymarginsofcapitalisminto its brightly lit boardrooms, remaking, in its wake, the entirety of the Americaneconomy.InDebtor Nation,Iexplainhowthisfi nancialrevo lutionhappened.
PersonaldebtassumedanewrolewithinAmericancapitalismonceit becamelegal,sellable,andprofitable.Thesedevelopmentsdidnotoccur 
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economy.FrequentlyinDebtor Nation,itwasnotbytheinvisiblehands ofthemarketbutbythevisiblemindsofpolicymakersthatnewfi nancial instruments and institutions were invented, causing these moments of rapid change.These two features-regulation and resale-combined in someunexpectedwaystoradicallyexpandAmericanborrowing.
Debtor Nation beginsinthatheadyperiodafterWorldWarI,when installmentcreditandlegalizedpersonalloansfirstbecamebigbusiness. Inchapters1through4,consumercreditentersthemainstreamofAmeri canfinanciallife,asbusinessandgovernmentforgenewlinksbetween consumers and capital. Consumer credit, as we know it today, did not precede the mass production economy of the 1920s.Though the core profitsofAmericancapitalismwererealizedthroughmanufacturing,for thefirsttimeconsumersneededfinancingtopayforallthegoodsthat wereturnedout. 3 Usurylaws,atthesametime,wererelaxedaroundthe country,asprogressivereformersattemptedtocreateaprofi tablealterna tive to loan sharks for industrial workers. During the 1930s, in an at tempttorightthefl ounderingeconomy,NewDealpolicymakersdevised themortgageandconsumerlendingpoliciesthatconvincedcommercial banksthatconsumercreditcouldbeprofitable,despitethebankers'long heldreluctancetolendtoconsumers.DuringWorldWarIIthegovern mentattemptedtoregulateinstallmentlendinginordertocontaininfl a tion,butthisinterventiononlypushedretailerstodevisedebtrelations outside the regulations, disseminating a new hybrid form of creditrevolvingcredit-acrossthecountry.Thepostwarworldunderpinnedby debtemergedfromthesepractices,developedintentionallyanduninten tionallythroughgovernmentintervention.
FollowingWorldWarII,newsuburbanitesrealizedtheAmericandream throughborrowing.Inchapters5and6,weseehowconsumercreditis inextricablefromthepostwardream.Borrowingwasatthecoreofboth postwar affluence and its decline, demanding a reconsideration of our nostalgiaforthepostwareconomy.SuburbanAmericansleftgovernment mortgagedhomesininstallmentfinancedcarstoshoponrevolvingcredit at shopping centers.These consumers borrowed more but they could also pay back what they owed. Americans learned to borrow in the midst of prosperity when, confident of stable future incomes, debt en abledconsumerstobuymoreandlivewell.Whilegrowthpersisted,in debted consumers experienced few deleterious effects. Consumers bor rowedbecausetheybelievedthattheirincomeswouldcontinuetogrow inthefuture-andtheywereright.Incomesrosesteadilyafterthewar from 1945 to 1970. Money borrowed today could be paid back more easilytomorrowand-asabonus-consumerscouldbuythatnewtelevi siontoday!Financialinstitutionslentmoremoney,andborrowerspaidit back.Inatimeofrisingincomesthatwerestable,consumers'expectations
and borrowing were quite reasonable. 4 Unfortunately the postwar pe riod, which defined"normalcy" to a generation of borrowers, was the aberration.
Aspostwargrowthtransitionedintostagflation,cracksbegantoap pearinthefoundationoftheeconomy.Inchapter7,ourcontemporary debtsystememergesthroughthepopularizationofcreditcardsanddebt securitization.Inthe1970s,unpaiddebtskyrocketednotbecausecon sumersbegantoborrow,butbecausetheycontinuedtoborrowasthey andtheirparentshaddonesinceWorldWarII,butwithoutthepostwar period'swellpayingjobs.Consumersofthe1980sincreasinglyborrowed todealwithunexpectedjoblossesandmedicalexpensesasmuchasto livethegoodlife,returningtoacreditworldthathadmoreincommon withthe1920sthanwiththe1950s. 5 Acreditsystempremisedonrising wagesandstableemploymentwasreappropriatedtoshoreupuncertain employmentandincomeinequality.Thoughcreditcouldbeusedtograp ple with shortterm unemployment and decreased income, in the long term loans still had to be repaid. Credit could dampen the swings of shorttermfortunes,butitcouldnotchangelongtermfates.Buoyedbya longboominhousingprices,Americansusedassetgrowthtosubstitute forwagegrowth,whichworkedfineaslongashousepricescontinuedto rise.
Consumerborrowinginthe1970swasnotnew,buttheamountthat creditorswerewillingtolendwas.Whileearliertwentiethcenturylend ingdependedontheresaleofdebt,thatresalewasalwaysbetweentwo parties that knew each other-mortgage company and insurance com panyorfinancecompanyandcommercialbank.Thesenetworksofresale enabledtheflowofcapitalfrominvestorstoborrowers,butthesechan nelsofresalewerenecessarilylimitedtonetworksofskilledbuyersand sellers.While borrowers and lenders referred to"debt markets," these highly structured, highly regulated networks bore little resemblance to the chaos of a market.After the 1970s, however, new fi nancial instru ments, assetbacked securities, allowed these networks to become mar kets. Credit markets were deep, anonymous, and global. Capital could comefromanywhereoranyoneandbeinvestedinconsumerdebt.This financialmarvel,bornofbothWashingtonandWallStreet,midwifedthe grand expansion of latetwentiethcentury borrowing, enabling Ameri canstoborrowmoreevenwhiletheirincomesbecamemoreprecarious. Capitaliststructureschangedmorethanconsumers'thriftiness. 6 Because ofthecleverstructuringofthefinancialinstruments,thesupplyoflend ingcapitalwasnearlylimitless.
Theparticularformsthatborrowingtook-installmentcontract,credit card, balloon mortgage-mattered as much as how much people bor rowed.Simpleaggregatestatistics,whilemeaningfulandeasytounder The two features of modern lending-regulation and resale-made consumerlendingprofitable,buttheprofitsofinvestingindebtrelative tootherinvestmentopportunitiesvariedovertime.Intheearlytwentieth century,installmentdebthelpedlargemanufacturingcompaniesrealize the profit on their production, but could not compare in profi tability. Personalloans,whileagoodsmallbusiness,wereignoredbylargebanks until the 1930s, when banks began lending to consumers only out of desperation and government policy. In the postwar period, consumer debt, especially revolving credit, began to become more profi table,but wasstillnotasprofitableasretailormanufacturing.Inshort,consumer credit,whileimportant,wasameanstoend.Bythe1960s,andincreas inglyinthe1970sand1980s,consumercreditbecameanendinitself,as a rapidly expanding profit center.The profitability of personal debtemerging after World War I, consolidating in the postwar period, and acceleratinginthe1970sand1980s-slowlyreorientedAmericanbanks andcorporationsawayfromproducinganddistributinggoodstofi nanc ingthem,withdireconsequencesforboththelongrunstabilityoftheir enterprisesandfortheAmericanworker. 8 Searching for the"human" face of capitalism has led historians to focustoomuchonculturalideasofdebt-neglectingthehistoryofbusi nessandpolitics,fundamentallymisinterpretingwhathashappened,and missing the opportunity to tell an alltoohuman story of how our choices,largeandsmall,havebroughtthisdebtdriveneconomytopass. There exist shockingly few histories of the modern credit system and thosethatdoexistfocusonculture-framedasmorality-totheexclu sionofbusiness.
9 Suchelisionsarenotuniquetothehistoryofdebt,but areendemicwithinthehistoryofAmericancapitalism.Recenthistorio graphic debates over twentiethcentury capitalism, usually framed as
consumercapitalism,havelargelytranspiredoncapitalism'ssurface,ig noring the deeper connections of fi nance.
10 Cultural historians have pointedtoadvertising,whileconsumerhistorians,entrancedbytheev erydayworldofgoodssurroundingthem,havelargelyignoredtheinsti tutions that financed and created them. Such a prioritization has been understandablegiventhat,formostconsumers,thisiswherecapitalism intersectswiththeirlives.Howpeopleexperiencetheworldofthingsis important.Atthesametime,historiansofallstripeshavetendedtofe tishize consumer goods, overlooking the flows of capital that brought thosegoodsintoexistence.
Our financial lives cannot be understood apart from the rest of our lives.Seeingtheworldoffinanceaseliteandsomehowoutsidethepur view of social history, historians have largely neglected one of the key sources of power in our society. 
